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lancaster.ac.uk (D.J. Worthington).Though manpower planning models have been part of OR for many years, and simulation has always
been acknowledged as a potential approach, there are few reported applications of its use. In this
case-based study we report on a micro-simulation model that exploits the structure of the European
Commission’s appraisal and promotion rules, and includes regression-based sampling schemes which
allow for non-Normal error terms to represent behavioural factors that led to the need for a new system.
With a suitably parsimonious formulation the 20,000 person model runs very effectively, and the trans-
parency associated with simulation proves an important factor in the successful use of the model as the
basis for designing a promotion box system that was implemented across the Commission in 2009. The
simulation modelling incorporates many Markov-type elements, and we reflect on important lessons
learned from this combined use of micro-simulation and Markov-based approaches to manpower
modelling.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This case-based paper shows how modelling approaches that
exploit problem structure can support decision making and plan-
ning in appraisal and promotion systems in which the vagaries of
human behaviour play an important part.
The European Commission (EC) is the executive arm of the
European Union (EU), which, at the time of the study, consisted
of 27 nations co-operating in a federation through their elected
representatives in the European Parliament. The Commission both
proposes and implements policy and is staffed by career officials
who are employed on permanent contracts or on secondments
from the home civil service of a member nation. As in most bureau-
cracies, the career progression of officials is managed through a
series of career grades through which officials pass when pro-
moted. Officials in higher grades are usually more experienced
and are paid more than those in lower grades.
The Commission wished to examine the operation of its apprai-
sal and promotion system with a view to seeking improvements
that could be implemented with the agreement of trades unions
and other interested parties (European Commission, 2006). The
officials responsible for the appraisal and promotion system recog-
nised that carefully crafted OR (Operational Research) models
could have an important role to play in this. As a result, they com-
missioned a study by the authors of this paper. A user-orientedll rights reserved.
: +44 1524 844885.
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pramanien), d.worthingon@description of the work that followed is given in Onggo et al.
(2010). In this paper, following a brief description of the issues fac-
ing the Commission, we focus on the important technical chal-
lenges faced in coping with behavioural factors that affect the
real operation of promotion schemes in which people’s perfor-
mance is subjectively rated and place our work in the wider con-
text of previous modelling of human resources systems. In
particular we developed a simulation-based approach employing
novel regression-based sampling schemes that allow efficient rep-
resentation of observed behaviour. The choice of modelling ap-
proach is important in manpower planning, and this case
provides a strong argument for the combined use of simulation
and Markovian principles to develop effective models for use in
practice and in research.
1.1. Career progression modelling in the European Commission
The EC career progression system must operate within some
constraints. The number of officials who move up the pay grade
ladder each year affects the expenditure of the Commission, which
means that the promotion system must operate with budgetary
constraints. In addition, following earlier negotiations with trades
unions and staff groups, the average time that officials spend in a
particular grade (known as promotion speed) is enshrined in EU
Law (European Commission, 2008). Thus, any scheme must guar-
antee average promotion speeds and must also operate within de-
fined budgetary frameworks. Any scheme must also must serve as
a spur to excellent performance by ensuring that high performers
are promoted demonstrably more quickly than those who perform
at average or below average levels.
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harder to guarantee in the actual operation of a promotion and ap-
praisal system. Inevitably, any such system will be subject to the
ingenuity of officials who wish to game the scheme to their own
advantage, or for the benefit of those whom they favour. Thus,
any comparison of the existing scheme with proposals for a
replacement system needs to be made in such a way that it reflects
the dynamic effects of likely behaviour including average and high
flyer promotion speeds, rather than a simple comparison of the
rules governing the schemes. Senior officials from the Commission
recognised that modelling approaches provide a way to represent
this behaviour, so as to greatly increase the chance that its future
appraisal and promotion system would operate properly
(European Commission, 2006).
An additional requirement was that the model should be devel-
oped in Microsoft Excel if possible. This was because the Commis-
sion officials were very familiar with Excel, and so it would aid
communication and transparency between modellers and EC cli-
ents, and among the EC officials and key stakeholders, such as
trades unions.1.2. The structure of this paper
As described in Onggo et al. (2010) this operational research
work was conducted in two phases:
I. Modelling the then current (as-is) system: to enable Commission
officials and trades unions to understand the likely effects of
continuing its operation. This showed that though well-
intended, the existing system was not fit for purpose and
needed to be replaced by a different approach that could meet
the Commission’s requirements in terms of costs and promotion
speeds, particularly of high performing officials.
II. Modelling alterative systems: to see whether they were likely to
perform better in terms of cost and promotion speeds, ensuring
that any comparison of existing and replacement systems was
based on equivalent assumptions and data.
The models developed in both phases exploit the structure of
the Commission’s appraisal and promotion schemes.
In the next section of this paper, we briefly describe both the as-
is system with which the project sponsors were unhappy, and the
replacement (Performance Box) system that was under consider-
ation and has since replaced it. We then discuss the different types
of approach advocated in the literature for the modelling and anal-
ysis of bureaucratic manpower planning, leading to our chosen ap-
proach. We next discuss the technical challenges faced when
developing and using simulation models of the as-is and replace-
ment systems, and our solutions to them. Finally we draw conclu-
sions that are relevant to this project, to manpower planning
models and to other problem areas that have similar structures.2. Important features of the Commission’s appraisal and
promotion systems
2.1. The as-is system
At the time, the Commission employed over 22,000 officials
organised into Directorates General (DGs). Officials occupied about
30 pay grades within which each official was subject to an annual
performance appraisal that resulted in a Career Development Re-
port (CDR). Promotion rounds occurred some months later and
were dependent on each official’s performance over several years,
as represented by points accumulated in the official’s promotionrucksack. If, by the promotion round, an official had accumulated
more points than a defined promotion threshold, he or she would
be promoted to the next, higher grade. This promotion resulted in
increased pay, but, in most cases, did not lead directly to a change
in the official’s work or responsibilities. The Commission’s pay
budget would be breached if there were too many promotions
but officials would be dissatisfied if there were too few.
2.1.1. Points for promotion
Two main types of promotion points were accumulated in an
official’s promotion rucksack:
1. Merit Points: these resulted from the annual CDR and were a
quantitative assessment of the official’s performance by his/
her line manager.
2. DG Priority Points: these were awarded at the promotion round
that occurred later, usually several months after the CDR.
Whereas Merit Points were awarded by the official’s line man-
ager, DG Priority Points were awarded by the Director General
of their DG.
The award of Merit Points was part of an official’s CDR, with
more points given to those whose performance was regarded as
excellent. However, appraisers did not have complete freedom of
action but had to abide by a set of rules, which were as follows
when the as-is system was introduced in 2003.
 An official would be awarded 0–20 Merit Points, with better
performance earning more points
 An award of 10 points was to indicate performance regarded as
just acceptable.
 An award in the range 10–13 for was to be used for satisfactory
performance.
 Across each DG, the average award was to be 14 points (later
this was revised to 14.5)
Note that the specification of an average score or 14 or 14.5 out
of 20 reflects a view in the Commission that the exacting selection
criteria for entry leads to the employment of high quality officials
whose typical performance is somewhat better than that in many
other organisations.
DG Priority Points were also awarded each year, but at the pro-
motion round that followed some months after the annual apprai-
sal round at which Merit Points were awarded. They were intended
to add flexibility to the promotion decision by allowing each of the
Directors General to establish their own promotion priorities for
the staff in their DGs. In this way, the as-is system was designed
so that promotion decisions were based on an official’s perfor-
mance, but also on whatever priorities were in place in the Direc-
torate General (DG) to which the official belonged. The award of
DG Priority Points was also prescribed, this time by two rules.
1. Between 0 and 10 DG Priority Points were to be awarded to
each official.
2. The total points available in each DG was constrained to
lead to an average of 2.5 per official, later revised to 2.3.
At the start of the study, it was not clear how different Directors
General awarded these points and there was some concern that
favouritism or victimisation could occur.
2.1.2. Gaining promotion
If, at the annual promotion round, after the award of DG Priority
Points, an official’s promotion rucksack was greater than the de-
clared promotion threshold, he/she was promoted and the points
in the rucksack were reduced by the removing the number
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then accumulate more Merit Points and DG Priority Points during
subsequent years until he/she acquired enough points for the next
promotion.
The promotion thresholds varied across the grades and also var-
ied in different years. They were set with the aim of allowing an
average promotion speed of three years within whatever budget-
ary constraints were in place at the time.
In summary, after four years of operation of the scheme, the DG
Admin officials who commissioned the study were concerned that
the process by which DG Priority Points were awarded was not
transparent and might be unfair; that the existing system might
not meet the legally required promotion speeds; that it might
not facilitate high-flyers sufficiently and that there was too much
variation in promotion thresholds due to budgetary constraints.
The Phase I model, described later in this paper, enabled them to
investigate these concerns.
2.2. Proposed replacement system: performance boxes
As a result of their concerns about the as-is system, officials in
DG Admin argued that a replacement system was needed, which
must meet three criteria.
1. It must satisfy EU Law that specified the average promotion
speeds, which meant that it would still be important to
take account of the time an official spends in a grade.
2. It should allow promotion thresholds to be kept more or
less constant from year to year under specific budgetary
assumptions.
3. It should reflect performance and only performance, which
meant that DG Priority Points were unlikely to be part of a
replacement system.
It was also agreed that these objectives were most likely to be
met by a system based on Performance Boxes, which are categories
into which an official is placed as a result of their performance dur-
ing the year in question. For example, a replacement system might
employ 5 boxes as in Table 1. In effect, a promotion box system
means that appraisers must mark to a curve by ensuring that a de-
fined percentage of officials is placed in each box each year. This
ought to make it easier to budget for promotions and would also
stop hidden grade drift, since any change to the proportion as-
signed to a box would be explicit.
Under this scheme, officials would be awarded Promotion Points
at an annual performance appraisal according to the promotion
box in which they were placed. These points would be accumu-
lated in their Promotion Points Rucksacks (PPRs). There would be
no separate Merit Points or DG Priority Points. The project sponsors
suggested that three criteria would be used to determine how
many Promotion Points an official would receive as a result of their
annual appraisal.
1. Their performance as assessed in the appraisal.
2. Their seniority (length of time in the current grade): the lon-
gest-serving officials were likely to be given more points.Table 1
An example of performance boxes.
Performance description % staff
Exceptional performance 10
Excellent performance 15
Very good performance 65
Adequate performance 8
Performance needing improvement 23. The gap between an official’s PPR before the appraisal and the
specified promotion threshold.
As before, an official would be promoted when he/she had en-
ough points to reach a defined promotion threshold and his/her
rucksack would be reduced by the value of the threshold as a result
of his/her promotion. As part of their investigation of a revised sys-
tem, officials and trades unions wished to investigate the effect of
different percentages in the performance boxes.3. Modelling and analysis in bureaucratic manpower planning
Manpower planning models for hierarchical bureaucracies usu-
ally distinguish between systems in which personnel movements
are ‘pushed’, ‘pulled’, see for example Bartholomew et al. (1991),
Bartholomew (1982) and Vassiliou (1982), or both (De Feyter,
2007). A push movement occurs when an official is promoted on
the basis of his/her performance rather than to fill a vacancy. A pull
movement occurs when an official is promoted because a vacancy
has occurred at a higher grade. In these terms, the Commission
operates a push promotion system in which officials are promoted
to the next grade when they have accumulated enough points.
Most manpower planning models are intended for use in forecast-
ing how many staff will occupy particular grades at some time in
the future, or in ensuring that sufficient numbers are in each grade,
see for example Bartholomew et al. (1991), Bartholomew (1982)
and Vassiliou (1997). The latter can also lead to optimisation mod-
els in which the grade requirements are constraints. Our work with
the Commission was somewhat different, because the focus was
not only the number in each grade, but also the effect of different
policies on promotion speeds, thresholds and budgets. It was espe-
cially important to model variations in promotion speeds, as well
as variations in numbers in each grade.
Modelling and analysis has a long history in manpower plan-
ning. Edwards (1983) notes that most manpower planning models,
of whatever type, can be regarded as stock:flow models, in which
the stocks are the number of staff occupying a grade and the flows
are staff who change grade, plus those who enter or leave an orga-
nisation each period. Wang (2005) summarises four main ap-
proaches to modelling manpower systems in large bureaucracies
as Markov chains, simulation, optimisation and system dynamics.
The first and third of these are usually expressed mathematically,
with the potential for theoretical results and insights, as well as
the possibility of finding optimal solutions. The second and fourth
are computer-based methods which have long been recognised to
offer the flexibility to incorporate more realistic operating rules,
see for example Bartholomew et al. (1991), but at some cost in
terms of computation time and lack of insights.
One of the contributions of this paper is to the issue of model
choice. Our major choice was between Markov chain, simulation
and system dynamic models, because the EC’s interest was in
exploration rather than optimisation. We therefore consider each
of these three in turn, in terms of their apparent suitability for
the work done with the EC.3.1. Different possible approaches
3.1.1. Markov models
Much published research, see for example the classic book of
Bartholomew (1982), and recent developments by Dimitriou and
Tsantas (2009, 2010), Guerry (2011) and Guerry and De Feyter
(2011), concentrates on Markov chain based models. These usually
represent push systems, in which at their simplest each staff mem-
ber is assigned to a class to represent their grade, and the same
transition probabilities apply to each staff member in that class
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time in grade as well as grade, the Markov chain model requires
a 2-dimensional state space recording the grade and time in grade
of staff members, see for example Štamfelj et al. (2009). Other Mar-
kov-based developments have included the introduction of exter-
nal states to represent people in training from whom recruits
need to be drawn (Dimitriou and Tsantas, 2010), and hidden Mar-
kov chains to reflect heterogeneity of staff within grades Guerry
(2011). Semi-Markov models have also been used to cope with
manpower systems in which transition times between grades
can follow any distribution, rather than the geometric distribution
that Markov models imply, see for example McClean (1980) and
Dimitriou and Tsantas (2011).
Many aspects of the EC problem can be viewed as a push model,
and so could in theory be tackled using a Markov model. However
transition probabilities in the as-is model depend not only on
grade, but also on rucksack and, as will be clear later, on previous
year’s Merit Points, leading to a very large 3-dimensional state-
space, in which many states would contain very few members. In
the proposed system promotion probability could also depend on
time in grade, potentially adding a fourth dimension to the state-
space. A final difficulty for this approach is one important non-
Markovian aspect of both the existing and proposed system, in par-
ticular the requirement that Priority Points are shared out between
officials, so making their promotion probabilities dependent.
3.1.2. System dynamics models
Wang (2005) argues that system dynamics approaches offer an
effective way to model manpower systems as a form of supply
chain and includes a simplified example of officer training in the
military. As commented earlier, hierarchical pay grade structures
of the type employed in the EC can be regarded as stock:flow sys-
tems in which the numbers in each grade constitute the stocks.
This is, of course, the basic metaphor of system dynamics, so it
should be no surprise that its use is advocated in manpower prob-
lems. However, reports of actual application are few in number.
Abdel-Hamid (1989) is a theoretical examination of system
dynamics to understand the effect of Brook’s Law (Brooks, 1975)
on the dynamics of software project staffing requirements and
Thomas et al. (1997) explores how systems dynamics might be
used in improving manpower planning in the US Army.
Parker and Caine (1996) discusses how the stock:flow formula-
tion of a system dynamics model has much in common with sim-
ple Markov formulations of the type discussed earlier. That is,
system dynamics models can also be used for estimating expected
values of grade populations. However, as with a Markov formula-
tion, flow rates need to depend on the same sets of factors, leading
to exactly the same state-space problems. Thus, system dynamics
approaches offer no theoretical advantage over Markov models
for the push system employed in the EC.
3.1.3. Simulation models
One of the earliest papers on manpower modelling (Weber,
1971) describes the development of a system simulationmodel that
represents officials as individual entities and tracks their progress
through time, making this progress dependent on whatever policy
is in place to determine grade transitions. Almost 15 years later,
Wegner (1985) proposes the use of micro-simulation in manpower
modelling, arguing that its simplicity and relative transparency
makes it easier for users to understand and, therefore, more likely
to be used than more mathematical approaches. This general point
about transparency is also made by Edwards (1983), which surveys
OR approaches tomanpower planning and comments that ‘the basic
principles of themodel should be capable of being explained to even
the most non-mathematical of users’. More recently, Mjema (2002)
describes how amicro-simulation approachwas employed to studythe effect of different staffing rules in a maintenance department,
with a purpose-built model written in SIMPLE++ (Geuder, 1995).
There are many different approaches to computer simulation as
employed in OR/MS (Operational Research/Management Science)
(Pidd, 2004). The most common simulation models applied in
manpower analysis are stochastic, dynamic, micro-simulations in
which the progress of each individual official is simulated through
time. The individual officers are modelled as the entities of the
simulation, each of which is assigned a set of attributes with values
that vary as the simulation progresses. These can be continuous
variables as well as discrete quantities or states. At each time
epoch of the simulation, these attributes are updated, usually
incorporating some form of random sampling, and the overall state
of the manpower system is the aggregate of the states (attribute
values) of the individual entities in the simulation. This entity-
based approach contrasts with Markov models and system dynam-
ics models in which changes in the population of each grade are
simulated, which assumes that all officials in a particular state
are identical. That is, in a micro-simulation, each simulated person
changes state through time, whereas sub-populations change state
in Markov and system dynamics models.
A second important difference between a Markov model and a
micro-simulation approach is that the latter allows the explicit
representation of the mechanisms causing the observed probabili-
ties of an individual moving from one class to another. In the case
of the EC as-is system, these moves are determined by the award of
Merit Points and DG Priority Points that, as will become clear later,
can be directly simulated using regression-based models. That is, a
micro-simulation allows the investigation of the varying ways in
which such points are actually awarded, which may then result
in the different transition probabilities. Likewise, the ability to
maintain the history of points awarded to individuals, together
with their promotion history, permits a much more detailed level
of analysis.3.2. Selecting a suitable approach
Both Markov and system dynamics approaches have the same
underpinning stock:flow structure that can be captured in linear
equations, andhave a good basicmatch to the ECmanpower system.
However both would require a massive state-space to mirror the
important features of the existing and proposed systems. Further-
moreMarkovmodels would not be able to copewith the dependent
transition probabilities of the EC systems, and system dynamics
models would not naturally provide estimates of probability distri-
butions. Hence, we adopted a dynamic micro-simulation approach
in which the promotionmechanisms that generate the career paths
of individual officials are represented transparently through simu-
lated time. The inclusion of random sampling methods allows us
to estimate distributions as well as expected values.4. Modelling the as-is system
The as-is promotion system in the Commission was somewhat
unusual, having two main types of points accumulated through
time, one based on merit but the other being much less transparent
in its operation. A stochastic, dynamic, micro-simulation allowed
the representation of the mechanisms and effects of the award of
those points, which was important for the sponsors of the work.
In the following sections we show how a micro-simulation model
in which each staff member is represented separately can ade-
quately represent the award of Merit and DG Priority Points, based
on the characteristics of the officials as they change through time.
This enabled the project sponsors to understand the stochastic nat-
ure of the system’s performance, allowing appreciation of the
Fig. 1. An overview of the as-is simulation model.
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simulations were implemented in Visual Basic, using Microsoft
Excel workbooks as user interfaces. They were designed to run ex-
tremely quickly, with a 10-year simulation of 20,000 officials com-
pleted in 4 seconds on an Intel Core Duo CPU with 3.16 gigahertz
core speed and 3 gigabyte memory running Windows XP profes-
sional. As shown in Fig. 1, the simulations mimic the two-stage
award of Merit Points and DG Priority Points, doing so for each
simulated official on a year by year basis.4.1. Data cleaning and standardisation
The models were based on the anonymised personnel records
from theHR (HumanResources) database of the Commission, which
at the time covered over 22,000 officials over a 4 year period. As is
normal when developing models from routinely stored data, some
data cleansingwas necessary to produce a consistent data set. SomeFig. 2. Scatter plot: Weighted Merrecords seemed anomalous, with strange values and, after discus-
sion with officials, were excluded from the analysis.
In addition, it became clear that officials who had left or joined
the Commission during the 4 years were treated somewhat differ-
ently in the current system. Hence, we were careful to separate the
records of officials who had joined or left the Commission during
the years covered by the HR database. These joiners and leavers
were modelled separately from the main datasets. The main mod-
elling effort went into understanding the operation of the current
system for officials who had served continuously with the Com-
mission during the 4 year period for which data was available.
Thus the analysis was based on just over 20,000 standard officials.
In the case of Merit Points, some records had to be further ad-
justed because officials promoted to a new grade at the previous
promotion round had not spent a full year in that grade and were
awarded only partial points because of this. Hence, the analysis
used Weighted Merit Points which were weighted by the length
of time an official had been in grade, if that was less than a year.
Modelling the award of Weighted Merit Points was relatively
straightforward, but modelling DG Priority Points was much more
difficult, due to the behavioural factors at work in their award in
each Directorate General.4.2. Modelling and simulating the award of Merit Points
As explained in Onggo et al. (2010), Merit Points are intended to
reflect performance and it seems reasonable to assume that the per-
formance of officials will vary in a systematic way because some
officials are high flyers, some are average performers and others
struggle to achieve this level. Hence it seemed likely that there
might be positive correlation between the Weighted Merit Points
awarded to an official 1 year when compared with the previous
year. Fig. 2 shows a scatter plot for officials in one of the grades, with
the vertical axis showing points awarded in 1 year and the horizon-
tal axis showing point awarded in the previous year. It is clear that
there is such a correlation, though it is far from perfect. Similar pat-
terns were observed in all grades and across all years for which datait Points in 2006 versus 2005.
Table 2
Extract from estimated transition matrix for Merit Points awarded to officials not promoted in the previous year (rounded to 2 decimal places).
Merit Points in next year
. . . 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 14.5 15 15.5 16 . . ..
Merit Points in previous year
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 . . . 0.46 0.19 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . . .
12.5 . . . 0.03 0.37 0.30 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 . . .
13 . . . 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 . . .
13.5 . . . 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.41 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.00 . . .
14 . . . 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.37 0.36 0.20 0.03 0.01 . . .
14.5 . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.39 0.44 0.11 0.02 . . .
15 . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.50 0.31 0.13 . . .
15.5 . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.49 0.37 . . .
16 . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.63 . . .
. . .
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more points that other officials each year and were likely to be pro-
moted quicker to the next grade. This observation provides a way to
represent differential performance in the simulations, given each
official’s Weighted Merit Point history.
Though there is clear correlation between successive years, con-
siderable scatter is apparent in Fig. 2. Further investigation re-
vealed that the observed correlation seemed to depend on
whether or not an official had been promoted in the previous year.
Using knowledge of whether an official had just been promoted led
to a regression model with two independent variables, as in Eq. (1):
Mi;nþ1 ¼ aþ b Mi;n þ c  Promi;n þ ei ð1Þ
where Mi,n+1 is the Weighted Merit Points awarded to official i in
year n + 1, Mi,n is the Weighted Merit Points awarded to official i
in year n, Promi,n is a (0,1) variable that indicates whether official
i was promoted in year n, and ei is a random error term.
Having fitted regression models to establish the relationships, it
might seem obvious that these should be used directly in the sim-
ulations to provide the expected Merit Points for year n + 1 based
on year n, adding Normal error terms by using a Box–Müller algo-
rithm (Box and Müller, 1958), to produce stochastic variation.
However, Fig. 2 shows that Normal error terms would not be
appropriate, as the distribution of error terms is far from symmet-
ric when the predicted points are either high or low. Furthermore
Merit Points obtained in this way would be continuous whereas
actual Merits Points are discrete. Our solution was to use the data
underpinning Fig. 2 to create simple Markov models, with maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of transition probabilities Ei,j: the prob-
ability that an official awarded i Merit Points last year will be
awarded j Merit Points in the current appraisal round. Since a pro-
motion in year n affects the Merit Points awarded in year n + 1, two
sets of matrices were estimated: one for officials promoted in year
n and the other for those who were not. Each pay grade had its own
pair of transition matrices. These were then used as look-up tables
in top-hat sampling (see Pidd, 2004, p. 177), to allow for the ran-
dom variation represented in the error term. In addition, look-up
tables for top-hat sampling were developed for joiners who were
injected into the simulation at specific grades. This top-hat sam-
pling from look-up tables allows very fast execution and, as stated
earlier, supports non-Normal error terms. Table 2 shows an extract
from the transition matrix used to define the look-up table for offi-
cials not promoted in the previous year for one particular grade.
Note that this is shown to two decimal places, leading to some
rounding errors.
Note, in passing, that whilst the set of relationships between
year-on-year Merit Points was derived by regression methods,each of the resulting relationships was well represented and effi-
ciently implemented as a simulated Markov chain.4.3. Modelling and simulating the award of DG Priority Points
Our analysis of the DG Priority Points actually awarded showed
that any model to represent the award of DG Priority Points would
be much more complex than that used to simulate the award of
Merit Points. It was important that such a model should reflect,
as far as possible, the actual processes used in awarding these
points, to be confident that the output of a simulation of the as-
is system reflected actual practice.
As stated earlier, up to 10 DG Priority Points were awarded to
each official, but each Director General had only a limited number
of these points to award to officials within a DG. In general, we
found that DG Priority Points at a promotion round were correlated
with the Merit Points awarded to an official in the appraisal that
preceded it. However there were other circumstantial factors that
also affected the award of DG Priority Points. Our analysis of the
dataset showed that the historical award of DG Priority Points re-
flected three factors. First, officials whose performance is highly
rated as indicated by their current year Merit Points tended to be
awarded more DG Priority Points. Secondly, officials who were
very close to a promotion threshold before the award of DG Priority
Points were usually awarded enough points to see them safely over
the threshold. Finally, it seemed that to ensure the correct distribu-
tion of the available aggregate number of DG Priority Points, the
number of points awarded were flexed up or down for officials
whose chance of promotion this year will not be affected by mar-
ginal addition of points.
These observations led us to divide officials, each year, into 6
groups, to reflect the behaviour played out by the Directorates Gen-
eral in awarding Priority Points to enable their staff to be promoted:
1. Officials who were promoted in the previous year.
2. Officials not promoted the previous year whose rucksack is
more than 10 points from the announced promotion
threshold before the award of DG Priority Points. These offi-
cials cannot be promoted this year.
3. Officials not promoted in the previous year whose rucksack
takes them to at least the announced promotion threshold
before the award of DG Priority Points. These officials are
expected to be promoted whatever the DG Priority Points
awarded.
4. Officials not promoted the previous year whose rucksack,
before the award of DGPriority Points, is closer than 4 points
to the announced threshold. From the data, we observed
Fig. 3. Promotional strength and expected DG points.
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to ensure that they reached the announced threshold and
were promoted.
5. Officials not promoted the previous year whose rucksack is
between 4 and 10 points from the announced threshold
before the award of DG Priority Points. Such officials will
be promoted if they are given enough points. The data sug-
gested that some of these are ‘backed’ by their superiors
and are given the points they need, whereas those not
backed are only given a small number of points, if any.
6. Officials who joined the Commission the previous year.
Based on these 6 groups, the award of DG Priority Points in the
as-is model was simulated by an indirect, three-stage process:
1. Compute the relative claim of each official to be promoted,
referred to as their promotional strength.
2. Adjust the promotional strength distribution to recognise
that the total points available are limited.
3. Sample the DG Priority Points awarded to each official
based on their adjusted promotional strength.
4.3.1. Stage 1: Compute promotional strength
Promotional strength is a concept devised for the modelling to
represent how likely an official is to be promoted given several fac-
tors, including the size of their promotion rucksack before the
award of DG Priority Points. It is based on the historical DG Priority
Points awarded to officials, and was defined in terms of five regres-
sion equations, one for each of groups 1–5. This promotional
strength of each official was an indication of their relative claim
to be promoted. These equations reflected our statistical analysis
which showed that, within each group, the DG Priority Points
awarded to each official were related to the Merit Points awarded
in the current year, the DG Priority Points awarded in the previous
year, whether he/she was promoted in the previous year and the
gap between the announced threshold and the rucksack before
the award of any DG Priority Points. Joiners (i.e. group 6) were trea-
ted differently as they have no promotional strength.
The form of the regression models fitted for promotional
strength was as in Eq. (2):
PSi;j;n ¼ Aj þ Bj Mi;j;n þ Cj  DGi;j;n1 þ DjGapi;j;n ð2Þ
where i identifies the official; j is the group to which the official be-
longs (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5); n is the current year; PSi,j,n represents the
‘promotional strength’ of official i in group j in year n; Aj, Bj,Cj and Dj
are constants that apply to all members of group j; Mi,j,n is the
Weighted Merit Points awarded to official i in group j in year n;
DGi,j,n1 is the DG Priority Points awarded to official i in group j in
year n  1; Gapi,j,n is the gap between the rucksack and promotion
threshold before the award of DG Priority Points in year n.
Using these equations produces measures of promotional
strength that are then used as a basis for sampling to produce
DG Priority Points in stage 3. However when actual DG Priority
Points are plotted against promotional strength it is clear that
the underlying relationships were non-linear, as shown for the
case of group 1 officials in Fig. 3 when expected DG Priority Points
are graphed against promotional strength.
4.3.2. Stage 2: Compute adjusted promotional strength by adjusting
the promotional strength distributions
The stage 1 analysis described above naturally leads to a set of
regression-based Markov models with non-Normal errors, as used
for merit points. However the fact that each Directorate General
has only a limited number of points to distribute is important, as
it means that DG Priority Points awarded to individuals are notindependent. As this dependence is not captured in the above
equations, there was a danger that the number of points awarded
in a simulation may be too high or too low in total, because the mix
of the current set of officials is different from the historic mix. In
order to adjust the distribution of these points to reflect their lim-
ited availability an adjustment to the raw promotional strength to
give an adjusted promotional strength is required. In particular the
promotional strength for officials in groups 1, 2 and 3 was ad-
justed, as these are the officials for whom DG Priority Points are
not critical in the current round. In essence, this adjustment at-
tempts to mimic the way that DG Priority Point allocations to these
groups of officials are varied in practice to match the available
aggregate number of points.
The flexing of the award of DG Priority Points is at the grade (g)
level, with a target average of 2.3. Defining function f1(PS) to be the
expected DG Priority Points for an official in group 1 with promo-
tional strength PS, as shown in Fig. 3, and f2(), f3 (), f4() and f5() to be
the equivalent functions for the other groups, then the adjustment
of promotional strength for officials in groups 1, 2 and 3 involves
the following steps.
1. For each grade g, calculate the expected Priority Points per






where Nj,g is the number of grade g officials in groupj for j = 1–
5; EPS[fj(PS)] is the expectation of DG Priority Points per official,
taken over all the promotional strengths of the officials of
group j in group g.
2. Suppose this value differs from the target average (2.3) by
some multiplicative factor d. Because the only adjustments
of promotional strength are for groups 1, 2 and 3, the mul-
tiplicative adjustment required for these groups (d0) needs
to be scaled up using Eq. (4):d0 ¼ d
P5
j¼1Nj;g
ðN1;g þ N2;g þ N3;gÞ ð4Þ3. For each grade, calculate constants c1, c2 and c3 by which to
modify the promotional strength equations for officials in
groups 1, 2 and 3 such that:EPS½fjðPSþ cjÞ ¼ EPS½fjðPSÞ  d0 ð5Þ
which we were able to approximate by the simpler and more
efficient requirement that:
fiðmeanj;gðPSÞ þ cjÞ ¼ fjðmeanj;gðPSÞÞ  d0 ð6Þ
Table 3
Look-up table for sampling DG Priority Points based on promotional strength (rounded to 2 decimal places).
Promotional strength DG Priority Points
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
60 0.96 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.87 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.60 0.20 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
P4 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
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in group j in grade g. Note that this was only possible because
within each group j in grade g officials mainly had similar pro-
motional strengths and the functions fj() (see Eq. (6)) were lo-
cally close to linear.Fig. 4. An overview of the performance box model.4. Use the additive constants c1, c2 and c3 to adjust the previ-
ously obtained promotional strengths of officials in classes
1, 2 and 3 of grade g.
4.3.3. Stage 3: Compute DG Priority Points
The final stage uses the adjusted promotional strength scores to
sample DG Priority Points that will be awarded to each simulated
official. By rounding promotional strength to the nearest integer,
the data underpinning the regression models could be used to
create a set of look-up tables in which probabilities reflected the
observed distribution of Priority Points associated with each value
of (rounded) promotional strength. Thus each group has a look-up
table which is used for top-hat sampling to produce the DG Priority
Points awarded to each official. For example, Table 3 shows
the matrix of estimated probabilities used to define the look-up ta-
ble for officials who were promoted in the previous year. These are
then used in top-hat sampling to allow for the random variation
represented in the error term. Note, in passing, that this part of
the overall simulation model is a Markov chain.4.4. Using the as-is model
This as-is model was developed iteratively in close co-operation
with the sponsoring officials from the Commission, which enabled
them to develop confidence that the model was appropriate and fit
for purpose. It was used to show what was likely to happen to the
existing system were it to be allowed to continue for a further ten
years. As might be expected in a stochastic simulation, the results
needed to be interpreted with some care, but it was clear that the
current system would be unable to meet the requirements set out
for it. That is, it would not guarantee average promotions speeds of
about 3 years within defined budgets even if promotion thresholds
were varied substantially from year to year. Thus, a new system
was needed and this, too, had to be simulated and the model had
to be accessible to trades unions as well as to the sponsoring
officials.5. Modelling the proposed performance box system
Section 2.2 summarised the preferred form of a replacement
system based on Performance Points and performance boxes. As
a result of their annual performance appraisal, each official would
be placed in a performance box and awarded Promotion Points
appropriate to the box. The technical challenge was to develop a
model that would allow a fair comparison between the as-is sys-
tem and one based on performance boxes. That is, both the as-is
model and a performance box model should be based on the re-
cords of the same set of officials, so as to reflect differing promo-
tion speeds and performance.In general, officials and trades unions were content that the
Merit Points recorded in the staff database could be regarded as
a reasonable reflection of relative performance. Thus the Perfor-
mance Box model could use the same sampling schemes for Merit
Points as the as-is model. However, for clarity, these are referred as
Notional Merit Points in the Performance Box model since they are
used somewhat differently as described below. The overall scheme
of the performance box models is shown in Fig. 4.
5.1. Allocation to performance boxes in the simulation models
Section 2.2 introduced three criteria that would be legitimately
employed to determine how many promotion points to award to
an official. The sponsors were not sure how important each of
these would be in the actual award of promotion points once the
system was in use. Furthermore the weighting of criteria used to
allocate points to officials within performance boxes might differ
from the weightings used to allocate them to performance boxes.
Hence the implemented model allowed users to specify these
rules.
Since the aim of a Performance Box system is to constrain the
distribution of points by fixing the percentage of officials in each
box, this had to be reflected in the simulation. This was done by
using the relative performance, relative seniority and relative pro-
motion gap for the officials in a grade. To achieve this, each official
was separately ranked according to the three criteria. That is, the
officials were placed in 3 ordered lists according to their promotion
gap, their seniority (these two being calculated before any award of
Promotion Points) and, finally, by their performance as reflected in
their Notional Merit Marks awarded in the simulation. Since gap,
seniority and Notional Merit Marks are all integers, each was sub-
ject to a small random jitter (Uniform (0, 0.9999)) to enable finer
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Merit Rank (M).
The three separate ranks G, S andMwere then combined to pro-
duce an overall, weighted sum using Eq. (7).
Overall score ¼ wgGþwsSþwmM ð7Þ
where wm is the percentage weight attached to the notional merit
mark, ws is the percentage weight attached to seniority and wg is
the percentage weight attached to the threshold gap.
An overall ranking was produced from this overall score. Once
ranked in this way, the top x% of simulated officials can be placed
in the top box, the next y% in the next box and so on. Points within
each box are then allocated using the same overall ranking process,
although the weights selected can be different from those used for
allocating between boxes.
5.2. Using the performance box models
The performance box models were devised so as to allow a fair
comparison between the as-is system and different variations on
performance box schemes. Thus, the software was designed so that
users could vary:
 the number of boxes and their descriptions,
 the percentage of officials allocated to each box,
 the promotion thresholds applying to each grade, and
 the weights to be applied to the seniority, gap and merit ranks.
In this way, model users could experiment with different
versions of the same overall scheme and could investigate likely
performance over the simulation period. Onggo et al. (2010) shows
some results and discusses some of the uses to which the models
were put in enabling the Commission to decide to adopt a perfor-
mance box system in 2009.6. Conclusions and reflections
6.1. Micro-simulation and Markov models
The micro-simulation based modelling approach described in
this paper has proved to be very valuable in tackling a major man-
power planning issue for the EC. As is often the case, a simulation
approach, though much less elegant, than more mathematically-
based approaches that are appealing in theoretical terms, enables
the inclusion of characteristics of the real-world problem that
may be impossible or very difficult to include mathematically. In
particular it has comfortably coped with the state-space explosion
that would have caused major problems for Markov or system
dynamics based approaches. It has also coped with the dependence
between promotion probabilities and the stochastic aspects of
behaviour which would have been problematic for Markov and
system dynamics methods respectively. The flexibility and trans-
parency of micro-simulation has also been a serious advantage,
allowing us to incorporate regression relationships and concepts
such as promotional strength in a way that EC officials recognised.
That is, we were able to model the mechanisms that led to year on
year changes in grade populations rather than the probabilities
that stem from those mechanisms. A similar approach could well
be beneficial in large manpower systems where management de-
vices such as appraisal systems or training schemes have very spe-
cific mechanisms that need to be represented.
Our choice of micro-simulation as a response to these modelling
challenges is not surprising, but we believe that it was also made
more effective by exploitation of Markov theory of manpower
systems. In particular we subjected the simulation model to a veryfocussed and parsimonious development process. This was in part
guided by the interests and instincts of the EC clients, and in part
guided by the well-established stochastic behaviour which Markov
models of similar systems led us to expect. For example, Markov
models have shown the sensitivity of system behaviour to
transition probabilities, often over and above almost all other sys-
tem characteristics, especially those associated with movements
from popular states. Hence, whilst the promotion mechanisms in
our simulation model are represented by means other than Mar-
kov-type approaches, lessons learned from Markov models were
crucial to the model building process. Markov models informed
both our statistical analysis of the available dataset and our inter-
actions with the stakeholders.
The potential of using micro-simulation and mathematical
models in combination to tackle real problems is now being recog-
nised in a number of fields. In the field of disease modelling, which
has very similar origins to manpower planning, there is a growing
recognition and acceptance of the important role of micro-simula-
tions to model real disease management systems in an efficient
and transparent way, see for example Stevenson et al. (2009). Like-
wise, in the field of queue modelling there is now considerable use
of micro-simulation models in combination with mathematical
models to tackle not only real problems, see for example Izady
and Worthington (2012), but also to underpin the development
of new theories and insights, see for example Atlason et al.
(2008). In both practical and research terms we believe that there
is similar potential for using micro-simulation and mathematical
models in combination in the field of manpower planning.
6.2. Properly constructed spreadsheet simulations can cope with large
models
The route to uncovering a parsimonious representation of the
mechanisms driving promotions was a pleasing combination of cli-
ent engagement and a focussed statistical analysis of a high quality
historical database. Stripping the model down to its crucial fea-
tures also meant that it was possible to build a very efficient
Monte-Carlo simulation model using VBA in Excel, rather than
using specialist simulation software. Excel is usually regarded as
too slow for applications of this type. However, careful attention
to detail in ranking algorithms and the use of look-up tables, re-
sulted in a simulation that ran extremely fast and allowed non-
Normal error terms. Since the Commission officials were very
familiar with Excel, this made it the obvious choice for a user inter-
face, with the underpinning VBA code available for inspection if re-
quired. This familiarity helped the communication between the
Lancaster team and the EC officials during model development
and model validation. It also helped the EC officials to discuss the
relative performance of different options and scenarios with key
stakeholders, such as trades unions.
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